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Abstract 
This article examines European Union (EU) approaches to the question of human rights 
violations in Kosovo before and after its proclamation of independence, in February 2008. 
While the 1999 NATO-led humanitarian intervention in the region was often justified as 
necessary due to the continuous abuses of human rights, perpetrated by the Serbian forces 
against the ethic Kosovo Albanians, the post-interventionist period has witnessed a dramatic 
reversal of roles, with the rights of the remaining Serbian minority being regularly abused by 
the dominant Albanian population. However, in contrast to the former scenario, the Brussels 
administration has remained quite salient about the post-independence context – a grey zone 
of unviable political and social components, capable of generating new confrontations and 
human rights abuses within the borders of Kosovo. Aware of this dynamic and the existing 
EU official rhetoric, it is possible to conclude that the embedded human rights concerns in 
Kosovo are not likely to disappear, but even more importantly, their relevance has been 
significantly eroded.   
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Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the then European Economic Community (EEC) and, to a 
lesser extent, the United Nations (UN) kept discussing and warning the Yugoslav leadership 
about its mistreatment of the Kosovo Albanian population, but these signals were largely 
ignored. As it happened to be the case, deeper ethnic antagonisms led to the outbreak of 
conflict in the province of Kosovo, culminating in January 1999, when Serbian military 
forces committed a crime against humanity by killing more than forty civilians in the village 
of Račak, in central Kosovo (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007, 542; Gordy 2013, 7; Kritsiotis 
2000). The consequent involvement of international actors in conflict settlements and 
mediation processes was often presented as necessary so as to calm down the two parties. 
The ethnic Albanian leadership declared unilateral independence of the province of Kosovo 1  
from Serbia in February 2008, but without having managed to provide the Serbian minority 
with a durable solution. The post-independence period has been characterized by a grey zone 
of unviable political and social components that are capable of generating new confrontations 
and human rights abuses within the borders of Kosovo. The difference is that while before 
the 1999 conflict, it was the Serbian forces who largely violated the rights of the Kosovo 
Albanians, now it is the local Albanians who rely on their dominant position to mistreat the 
remaining minorities. Even though the international community has continued to call for 
reconciliation between the local Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, substantial engagement with 
difficult human rights issues seemed to lag behind – an approach of particular significance if 
we consider that human rights abuses played a critical role in generating the 1999 NATO-led 
humanitarian intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
Although the existing literature about the 1999 Kosovo war has extensively dealt with 
a number of different issues – including the overall context (Bieber and Daskalovski 2005; 
Buckley and Cummings 2001; Judah 2002; Kostovicova 2005; Mertus 1999; Phillips 2012), 
the legality and possible consequences of the NATO involvement (Croft and Williams 2006; 
Falk 1999; Glennon 1999; Husanović 2000; Steinberg 1999; Wedgwood 1999), the post-
interventionist local and international positions (Bacevich and Cohen 2001; Bellamy 2002; 
Capussela 2015; Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000; Ker-Lindsay 2009; Lambeth 2001; Latawski 
and Smith 2003; Radeljić 2014; Shepherd 2009; Tomuschat 2002; van Ham and Medvedev 
2002), Kosovo’s proclamation of independence and its recognition (Borgen 2010; Hilpold 
2012; Milanović and Wood 2015; Perritt 2011; Summers 2011; Weller 2009), and, finally, 
Kosovo’s capacity to pursue necessary reforms in order to become a viable state (Beha 2015; 
Cocozzelli 2013; Dursun-Ozkanca and Crossley-Frolick 2012; Radin 2014; Skendaj 2014) – 
the question of human rights abuses in Kosovo, before and especially after its independence 
has not received enough scholarly attention. Amongst the available accounts, Sarah Kernot’s 
comparative analysis of two interventions (in Somalia and Kosovo) represents an important 
contribution, as it questions the link between humanitarian intervention and protection of 
human rights; she suggests that although some populations can perceive such interventions as 
beneficial, “the methods employed to conduct interventions have operated in opposition to 
those required for the protection of human rights” (Kernot 2006, 42). Looking even more 
closely, Julie Mertus shows convincingly that “the civil and military intervention in Kosovo, 
although undertaken with the aim of supporting human rights norms, has to some extent 2  
served to undermine efforts to build a sustainable human rights culture in Kosovo” (Mertus 
2001, 21–22). The question of human rights protection is further complicated by some 
additional criticisms, such as the largely insufficient (if not failed) cooperation between 
human rights officers and the military (Baldwin 2006; Månsson 2001), and slow deployment 
and lack of knowledge of UN Civilian Police, as a part of the UN Mission in Kosovo 
arrangement (Decker 2006). From a different, legal, perspective, examinations of the relation 
amongst sovereignty, human rights and self-determination, tried to suggest that “[t]he final 
political status of Kosovo is ultimately a human rights issue, and a just and viable solution 
must balance the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia with the human rights of 
Kosovar Albanians. At another level, the challenge is how best to achieve self-determination 
for Kosovar Albanians while ensuring the rights of other groups and minorities within 
Kosovo” (Brown 2005, 236–237).  
This article complements the above-mentioned analyses by tracing the development 
of European Union official rhetoric that has tackled human rights abuses in Kosovo before 
and after its proclamation of independence. Given that the EU has become the key player not 
only in the case of Kosovo, but also in the wider Western Balkan region (due to its 
aspirations to become part of the EU), I primarily focus on debates and statements produced 
by the Brussels administration. Accordingly, while it is possible to argue that EU 
representatives offered rather different understandings as to who was subjected to human 
rights violations in Kosovo in the 1980s, with the advancement of the Yugoslav state crisis, a 
clearer picture was established, making it easier to justify the 1999 military intervention. 
However, aware of a highly problematic post-interventionist and post-2008 dynamics, this 
article suggests that the embedded human rights issues in Kosovo are not likely to disappear 
if they are to be addressed within the current framework, largely characterized by the lack of 
domestic as well as international incentives.    
Debating Human Rights Concerns in Kosovo  
 
Based on the official documents of the archives of European Union institutions, the European 
Economic Community discussed the situation in Kosovo for the first time in July 1981, 3  
following the earlier confrontations between students of the Priština University and the local 
police which had resulted in a state of emergency and the sealing of Kosovo’s borders 
(Artisien and Howells 1981). The European Parliament, while noting that the riots caused 
“the deaths of between 11 and 350 people depending on the sources, that between 22 and 
3,500 people are reported to have been imprisoned,” and that it was “aware of the existence 
of the strong demand for independence within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” 
requested the Community’s highest officials “to express their concern to the Yugoslav 
Government and to press for the Albanian section of the population of Yugoslavia to be 
guaranteed equal opportunities for development in the economic, social, cultural and 
structural spheres” (European Parliament 1981). It is important to note that at this occasion 
the Brussels officials cited the 1966 UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, stating that “[a]ll people have the right of self-determination. By virtue of 
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development” (Ibid.).  
However, the available primary sources, both in Brussels and Belgrade, do not tell us 
if the Yugoslav leadership received the above request; and, what could have been even more 
relevant, how it responded to the criticism relating to its treatment of Albanians. Still, the 
possible decision not to criticize Belgrade directly should not be interpreted as signifying that 
there was some sudden termination of ethnic tensions, but rather as signifying that the 
Europeans themselves were confused about the Kosovo question. For example, Marco 
Pannella, Member of the European Parliament (MEP), talked about the endangered Serbs in 
Kosovo, maintaining that they were actually the ones “likely to see their rights completely 
denied by the local Albanian majority” (European Parliament 1983). Responding to this 
view, Doeke Eisma, another MEP, while acknowledging that “[t]he EEC must no create the 
impression of interfering too much in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia,” stressed that what 
Amnesty International had reported was quite disturbing – that some of the activists during 
the 1981 riots were given sentences that were “not in line with the stipulations of the United 
Nations” and that “human rights [were] being infringed” – and thus “in addition to economic 
cooperation between Yugoslavia and the EEC [they] must have a political reaction from the 
Council of Ministers meeting in political cooperation on the fate of political prisoners in that 
country” (Ibid.). 
In 1987, Slobodan Milošević, previously elected president of the Serbian branch of 4  
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, delivered a speech in Kosovo in which he called 
for the “defense of the sacred rights of the Serbs” (Milošević cited in Noel Malcolm 1998, 
346), a rhetorical tool that did nothing more than to encourage fears about Serbian intentions 
in the province of Kosovo. Somehow, at this particular point, the European Parliament did 
not realize and thus did not discuss growing nationalistic feelings on the Serbian side, but 
instead focused on and reported about the Kosovo Albanians: “Groups demanding autonomy 
have been particularly active in Kosovo, where they are no longer calling for the status of an 
autonomous region but that of a fully-fledged republic, arguing their point on mainly ethnic 
grounds” (European Parliament 1988). Similarly to Pannella’s earlier observation, the report 
stressed that “the danger at present is that non-Albanian communities may be effectively 
expelled from Kosovo” (Ibid.). In order to understand the Albanian approach, the report went 
as far as to question whether the economic backwardness of Kosovo (in contrast to other 
parts of Yugoslavia) could have represented the basis for frustration and nationalistic hatred. 
Still, it concluded by stressing that “the Kosovo affair … shows that it is better to prevent the 
occurrence of nationalistic hatred rather than to cure the damage it can create” (Ibid.). 
The ever-present tension between the Serbian authorities and local Albanians 
culminated with the Serbian takeover of Kosovo’s institutions, securing additional attention 
and comments from European Community officials. For example, in a resolution on 13 April 
1989, the European Parliament, while portraying the situation in Kosovo as “explosive” and 
“bordering on civil war,” stressed, amongst other concerns, that “the danger to peace, if 
nationalist sentiments in Yugoslavia continue to be inflamed, could have grave consequences 
for Europe” and, in order to avoid such scenarios, requested that “the Serbian authorities to 
show awareness of and sympathy for the anxieties of the Albanian inhabitants of Yugoslavia 
and call[ed] on the Albanian majority living in the province of Kosovo to respect the rights of 
the Serb minority” (European Parliament 1989). In June, Milošević visited Kosovo again to 
deliver his Gazimestan speech, marking the six-hundredth anniversary of the Battle of 
Kosovo. There, as rightly assessed by James Gow (2003, 10), “large numbers of [the crowd] 
supported the broad aims of the Serbian nationalist project and were receptive of to the idea 
of Serbian victimhood. The Milošević campaign was predicated on the notion of redressing 
this mood of victimization and restoring the sense of Serbian pride and, most important of all, 
power.” Accordingly, concerned about further erosion of human rights, another EP resolution 
insisted that “human rights must be granted to all citizens without discrimination, whereas 5  
citizens are fully untitled to liberate themselves from any regime which suppresses their 
identity and whereas their efforts to secure freedom, democracy and pluralism must be 
recognized” (European Parliament 1990a). However, in contrast to the earlier resolutions that 
clearly presented the local Albanians as a potential threat, at this stage the Brussels 
administration seemed to have adopted a rather different narrative, referring to them as 
potential victims. The European incapacity to identify and then fully understand the problems 
of the Yugoslav federation has been exposed to harsh criticism in the literature. In his study 
on the demise of Yugoslavia, Victor Meier (1999, 217) wrote: “|The Western diplomats in 
Belgrade, most of whom went beyond the city limits of the capital only with great reluctance 
…, seemed, practically without exception in the last two years of Yugoslavia’s existence, to 
have misunderstood the realities of this country. In the last six months of Yugoslavia, their 
hostility to reality assumed grotesque dimensions. I must admit that the views which I heard 
from the circle of Western diplomats at this time made an almost traumatic impression and 
that I had never before encountered such a colossal jumble of political error, lazy thinking 
and superficiality as I encountered then among the Western diplomatic corps in Belgrade.”    
Kosovo’s First Proclamation of Independence 
 
The Serbian takeover of Kosovo’s institutions (including the parliament of Kosovo, the 
courts and police, the industry, Radio and Television Priština) resulted in the local Albanian 
decision to establish a parallel state, declaring Kosovo first a republic within Yugoslavia in 
1990 and then an independent state in 1991. Here, the European Parliament, “having regard 
to the discriminatory measures taken by the Serbian authorities against ethnic Albanians in 
Kosovo,” and “having regard to the alarming reports on the situation in Kosovo from 
numerous recognized and highly respected human rights organizations such as Amnesty 
International, the UN’s International Federation of Human Rights and the Helsinki 
International Federation for Human Rights,” called on the Serbian authorities “to take 
whatever measures are needed to ensure respect for human rights in Kosovo” and “to ensure 
that (i) the 1974 constitution is recognized and properly respected, (ii) the Albanian 
population’s right to cultural and political autonomy is recognized, (iii) there is an end to the 6  
removal of Albanians from Kosovo and the ‘recolonization project’ is stopped” (European 
Parliament 1990b). It is worthy of mention that this was the first motion for a resolution 
instructing the President of the European Parliament to forward it “to the Commission, the 
Council, the Foreign Ministers meeting in EPC [European Political Cooperation], the Serbian 
and Yugoslav authorities, the president of the provincial parliament of Kosovo and the 
responsible representatives of the Albanian people in Kosovo” (Ibid.). 
The subsequent resolutions continued with placing the blame on the Serbian 
leadership, seeing its policies as capable of “causing an outbreak of civil war in Yugoslavia” 
(European Parliament 1991a). In addition, they tended to offer rather precise numbers of the 
ones subjected to human rights abuses: three secondary schools and one primary school were 
closed, 350 teachers and 7,000 pupils expelled, the Albanian theatre and library in Kosovo 
shut and the local archives confiscated by the Serbian authorities, numerous doctors and 
nurses fired and replaced with Serbs, about 50,000 Albanian workers dismissed and so on 
(Ibid.). Accordingly, the European Parliament urged the Serbian Government “to abandon 
forthwith its repressive policy in Kosovo which is clearly aimed at destroying the cultural 
identity, the economy and the democratic rights of its Albanian inhabitants” (Ibid.). A joint 
debate that followed was scheduled in order to discuss the crisis and assess human rights 
violations in Kosovo. As expected, the continuing oppression of the Albanian population in 
Kosovo was confirmed. As Jaak Vandemeulebroucke, one of the participants put it, the 
Serbian policy was “deliberately aimed at destroying the Albanian language and culture” and 
the only way to prevent this from happening was to make respect for human rights an explicit 
precondition for the signature of the forthcoming financial protocol as well as for 
Yugoslavia’s membership in the Council of Europe (European Parliament 1991b). In 
addition, Pavlos Sarlis, another MEP, warned the Parliament as a whole that it should not 
give up on Kosovo in its debates and, in fact, called the colleagues to “include Kosovo 
among the subjects for urgent and topical debate, for as long as violence and oppression 
continue to hold sway” (Ibid.).  
Apart from the human rights concerns, the aforementioned debate was important for 
other reasons as well. First, it contributed to the relevance of discourses about ‘us’ versus 
‘them’, very often implying ‘good us’ versus ‘bad them’; as Mechthild von Alemann, phrased 
it, “[h]ere in Western Europe, we have learnt to get on with each other. We no longer use 
guns against one another, and the major peoples respect the smaller ones and their cultural 7  
identities” (Ibid.). Later, such an approach towards the Yugoslav space was often used when 
discussing the Yugoslav state crisis at European Union level and why certain policies should 
be pursued (Radeljić 2012), as well as in the literature accounts, some of which went as far as 
to claim that “[t]he Yugoslav conflict shocked the civilized West” (Lucarelli 2000, 1). The 
second reason for why the debate was important has to do with the fact the MEPs generally 
agreed that the Kosovo issue “has now become a European issue,” requiring even greater 
involvement of Europeans in the region (European Parliament 1991b). However, even after 
this advocacy, the external involvement continued to be very limited. And, finally, the debate 
was important, as some of its participants seemed already sceptical about the future of the 
Yugoslav federation as such; one of them said that Yugoslavia was “ill-conceived in 
historical terms,” characterized by “ethnic, cultural and religious differences” that “can no 
longer be overcome,” suggesting that “there can only be one solution: since there is no single 
Yugoslavian nation state, we have to help regions like Croatia, Slovenia and Kosovo achieve 
their independence” (Ibid.). 
By maintaining that “[t]he Serbian regime has begun a process of economic and 
cultural genocide” in Kosovo and that “[h]uman rights are inseparable from the people’s 
rights and the right to self-determination,” some European officials were leaving an 
impression that independence of the province of Kosovo could become an option at some 
point (European Parliament 1991c). In addition, in their view, the Kosovo problem was not 
the only one which existed: “There is also the problem of the Serbian minority in Croatia, 
which has been armed in the form of a militia by the supporters of the Serbian dictator 
[Milošević] and which for several months now has been creating very serious disturbances in 
some areas of Croatia,” completely rejecting “to accept freedom,” resulting in 
“demonstrations in the streets of Belgrade, that this government is both imperialist and 
totalitarian” (Ibid.).    
Kosovo during and after the Collapse of Yugoslavia 
 
The outbreak of the Yugoslav wars in the summer of 1991 and the consequent European 
Community’s decision to recognize Slovenia and Croatia as independent states in January 8  
1992 contributed to further internationalization of the conflict. Back then, Kosovo seemed to 
be a marginal issue for policy-makers; in fact, its application to be considered for 
international recognition of independence was refused without hesitation (Caplan 2005, 139). 
Still, this does not mean that Kosovo was also marginal in official debates, especially ones 
including notions of self-determination and therefore insisting that “the principle of self-
determination must be reconciled with a respect for the rights of all the people, all the 
minorities who live in the individual republics, starting with the Albanians in Kosovo” 
(European Parliament 1991d).  
One of the reasons why Kosovo was ignored, even though human rights abuses 
continued to plague day-to-day life, could have to do with European officials themselves, for 
whom Slovenia and Croatia, often labelled as the only two truly pro-Western (in cultural and 
religious terms) Yugoslav republics, deserved priority treatment. In addition, as Doris Pack 
complained, there was an obvious lack of understanding of the relevance of human rights 
concerns and thus urgency to develop a common approach amongst the EU’s institutions, a 
postponement capable of questioning the moral credibility of the European Community. In 
her view, “[i]f the Commission and the Council had taken the resolutions of Parliament 
seriously last year, they would have blocked the transfer of funds to Yugoslavia because of 
human rights violations in Kosovo – who knows whether the Serbian Government would 
then have felt so strong” (European Parliament 1991e). 
As the 1990s progressed, the European Parliament continued to report on violations of 
human rights, calling for “recognition and restoration of the rights of the people of Kosovo, 
including the universal right of self-determination, followed by the granting … of an 
appropriate degree of autonomy within the Serbian state, as this is the only way – apart from 
self-determination in the form of a secession – to satisfy the rightful demands of the people” 
(European Parliament 1992). In this period, the United Nations also commenced to pay 
greater attention to the issue of human rights in Kosovo. For example, in December 1994, the 
General Assembly condemned “the measures and practices of discrimination and the 
violations of human rights of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo committed by the authorities of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),” calling them to “[t]ake all 
necessary measures to bring to an immediate end all human rights violations,” and, very 
importantly for the later events, encouraging “the Secretary-General to pursue his 
humanitarian efforts in the former Yugoslavia, … to tackle the critical needs of the people in 9  
Kosovo” (United Nations 1994). The four resolutions that followed, adopted in annual 
sessions of the General Assembly (United Nations 1995; United Nations 1996; United 
Nations 1997; United Nations 1998) altogether pointed out the continuation of grave 
violations and abuses of human rights by the Yugoslav leadership. For example, the last of 
them, talked about violations “including summary executions, indiscriminate and widespread 
attacks on civilians, indiscriminate and widespread destruction of property, mass forced 
displacement of civilians, the taking of civilian hostages, torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment, in breach of international humanitarian law,” and, very importantly for 
the international community, “the denial of appropriate access to Kosovo of non-
governmental organizations, the manipulation and denial of relief and basic foodstuffs, and 
the denial of medical care to wounded civilians” (United Nations 1998). Still, Serb civilians 
were also victims; as documented by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), “[t]hroughout June and July 1998 there were many physical attacks on the 
Serb minority living in Kosovo. Killing, abduction, attacks and looting of houses occurred in 
villages in predominantly Kosovo Albanian-populated areas. Some of the Serbs were warned 
by their Kosovo Albanian neighbours about planned assaults and requested the assistance of 
the local police” (OSCE 1999, 230). 
Looking back, the fact that the international community and, in particular, European 
Union representatives – although pretty aware of human rights violations performed by the 
authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – did not use the 1995 Dayton Peace 
Accords to also address the autonomous status of Kosovo was a serious matter of concern 
amongst the Kosovo Albanians, often interpreted as European disinterest in addressing their 
needs (Laakso 2006, 152; Sell 2002, 274; Toje 2008, 52). Thus, leaving the Kosovo question 
unaddressed represented an opportunity for the militarist Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to 
criticize and ignore a pacifist doctrine of the Democratic League of Kosovo – an approach 
that generated a number of confrontations between local Albanians and Serbian forces.  
Still, for various Western officials, independence seemed the only way forward; for 
example, Willem van Eekelen, a Dutch senator, while criticizing the West for “making the 
mistake of saying it prefers to keep the remainder of Yugoslavia together,” observed that “the 
proliferation of small, perhaps unviable states is not an attractive prospect,” but then 
questioned “why make a difference in principle between, say, Slovenia and Kosovo when 
fundamental human rights are being crushed” (van Eekelen 1998)? Apart from officials, 10  
some non-profit organizations also favoured independence. In late 1998, the pro bono Public 
International Law and Policy Group suggested to begin with an intermediate sovereignty, 
characterized by a phased reduction of Serbian control over the province of Kosovo that 
would in turn allow the local people to acquire sovereign authority, capable of protecting 
legitimate interests of the Serbian minority, and finish with a referendum on independence 
and pursuit of international recognition. However, the frequent disputes and confrontations 
between the Serbian troops and the KLA culminated in January 1999 when Serbian military 
forces committed a crime against humanity by killing more than forty civilians in the village 
of Račak, in central Kosovo. At this point, there was a clear transatlantic ambition to prevent 
the Serbian President Slobodan Milošević from completing a strategy of ethnic cleansing and 
achieving full control of the territory. According to Joschka Fischer, the then German Foreign 
Minister, acting politely with Belgrade officials would lead only to more mass graves, so he 
stated that the use of force should be taken into consideration: “I am not a friend of using 
force, but sometimes it is a necessary means of last resort. So I am ready to use it if there is 
no other way. If people are being massacred, you cannot mutter about having no mandate. 
You must act” (Fischer cited in Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000, 75). Similarly, Tony Blair, the 
British Prime Minister, tried to justify the approach adopted: “We need to enter a new 
millennium where dictators know that they cannot get away with ethnic cleansing or repress 
their peoples with impunity. We are fighting not for territory but for values. For a new 
internationalism where the brutal repression of ethnic groups will not be tolerated – for a 
world where those responsible for such crimes have nowhere to hide” (Blair cited in Dunér 
2001, 59). 
Once the 1999 NATO-led humanitarian intervention had terminated, the European 
Union saw the region impoverished and in need of aid. It persuaded the international 
community to collaborate in the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, which was adopted 
in Cologne in June 1999. At the same time, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1244 established the UN Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK), exercising full 
executive, legislative and judicial role. The resolution declared the “establishment of an 
interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which 
the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim 
administration was to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing 11  
the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions 
for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo” (United Nations 1999a). Soon 
after, the General Assembly adopted one further resolution on the situation of human rights in 
Kosovo, adding to its previously mentioned worries, something new; it “express[ed] its 
concern about the forced division of any part of Kosovo into ethnic cantons or ethnically 
based divisions of any type, … and stress[ed] the need for all parties in Kosovo to take all 
necessary measures to stop or reverse any action that de facto or de jure permits such ethnic 
cantonization” (United Nations 1999b). 
As it happened to be the case, the post-1999 Kosovo has witnessed the establishment 
of Serbian enclaves that are fully politically and economically integrated with Serbia. As one 
scholar observed, “Serbs live in fortified enclaves, their access roads often guarded by NATO 
patrols. Before the war, two of Kosovo’s largest cities, Priština and Prizren, were home to 
tens of thousands of Serbs. They are now virtually Serb-free … In many Serbian enclaves, no 
one holds a steady job; the communities rely on handouts from aid organizations and from 
Belgrade” (Kupchan 2005). Thus, in contrast to the period before the intervention, when the 
Serbs abused human rights of the Kosovo Albanian population, the post-interventionist 
period faced an immediate change of roles, this time with the local Albanians ready to abuse 
their dominant position and thus mistreat the remaining Serbs. Looking at this period, Clive 
Baldwin argues that “the international community failed on the critical issue of minority 
security. Human rights experts, although documenting the situation and attacks at length, 
were rarely able to go beyond this to offer solutions. Recommendations coming from OSCE, 
usually those requested by minorities, namely increased KFOR [the NATO-led Kosovo 
Force] protection, which was not viable in the long term. KFOR was rarely willing to listen 
to the OSCE, which it regarded as unqualified to comment on military matters. At the same 
time, KFOR was unable to offer any solution beyond the temporary posting of armed guards” 
(Baldwin 2006, 494). Aware of the problems and continuing confusion, the international 
community welcomed the “standards before status” approach, inaugurated by the third UN 
Mission in Kosovo chief, Michael Steiner of Germany, in 2003, suggesting that in order to 
have its status resolved, Kosovo would need to satisfy certain standards. Although the 
“standards before status” policy covered a variety of issues, ranging from the establishment 
of democratic institutions and rule of law to the development of market economy and 
dialogue with Belgrade authorities, its essence “was that it required Kosovo’s institutions of 12  
self-government to demonstrate that they were willing and able to protect the rights of all of 
Kosovo’s ethnic communities, and had the capacity to act in a civilized way” (Ante 2010, 
150).  
The advocacy of “standards before status” was fully eroded and, in fact, abandoned 
after the riots in mid-March 2004, involving more than 50,000 ethnic Albanian extremists 
that gathered to attack Serbs and Roma (Human Rights Watch 2004). In the newly 
established grey zone, the Standards Implementation Plan was introduced, placing a 
particular focus on the economy, rule of law and dialogue between Belgrade and Priština. 
Thus, the international community, while positioned between the two opposing sides, 
understood that any substantial progress with regard to human rights could not be made any 
time soon, but also that lack of status and Kosovo’s security were affecting the entire Balkan 
region. As one author correctly put it, “[s]ince the end of the Kosovo conflict in summer 
1999, the international community has wrestled with a dilemma. There is no prospect for 
genuinely sustainable stability in the region as long as the status of Kosovo has not been 
resolved. At the same time addressing this issue in itself presents considerable risks to 
stability. If the international community tackles the status issue without adequate preparation, 
deadlock at best and confrontation at worst might be the result. If it waited for too long the 
unstable elements on the ground, in particular the impatience of the Kosovar population, the 
persistent economic crisis and the still tense relations between the ethnic communities might 
well lead to a new crisis” (Lehne 2004, 116).  
As pointed out elsewhere, the 2005 and 2006 Vienna talks, aimed at resolving the 
final status of the province of Kosovo, outlined how sensitive the question of human rights 
truly was and that the international community could not really exclude new attacks against 
the local minorities (Radeljić 2014, 436–437). Having witnessed that the Serbian and Kosovo 
Albanian sides were not ready to compromise – meaning that each of them approached the 
talks with a plan A only, which indirectly implied that one of them would exit the whole 
process as an absolute winner and the other as an absolute loser – the Brussels administration 
decided to explore a new set of options, including establishment of a new mission, under the 
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, to assist Kosovo in pursuing necessary reforms.     
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Kosovo’s Second Proclamation of Independence 
 
In February 2008, Kosovo adopted a resolution, proclaiming independence from Serbia. As 
the Council of the European Union understood it, “the resolution commits Kosovo to the 
principles of democracy and equality of all its citizens, the protection of the Serb and other 
minorities, the protection of the cultural and religious heritage and international supervision” 
(EU Council 2008b). In April, the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo was fully enacted, 
which, in almost complete contrast to the declaration of independence, seems to over-
emphasize the relevance of human rights. For example, its very beginning claims that 
“Kosovo exercises its authority based on the respect for human rights and freedoms of its 
citizens and all other individuals within its borders” (The Republic of Kosovo 2008, 
Constitution, Chapter I, Article 1). Interestingly, this rather short constitution mentions the 
notion of human rights more than twenty times, in similar or less so contexts. Amongst 
others, it stipulates that “[t]he institutions shall operate in full transparency and in accordance 
with internationally recognized democratic standards and human rights” (Ibid., Chapter XI, 
Article 125) and “[o]rganizations or activities that infringe on the constitutional order, violate 
human rights and freedoms or encourage racial, national, ethnic or religious hatred may be 
prohibited by a decision of a competent court” (Ibid., Chapter II, Article 44). 
 Following the proclamation of independence, the Ombudsperson Institution in 
Kosovo (OIK) started producing reports in correlation with the constitution in terms of 
human rights. In its initial assessment, the OIK observed that “[e]ffective implementation of 
the standards for the protection of human rights, the consolidation of the judiciary and 
prosecutorial system, as well as fight against organized crime and corruption still remain 
amongst the biggest challenges for the new state of Kosovo” (OIK 2010, 6). Later reports 
kept insisting on the importance of human rights protection and relevance of OIK’s 
cooperation with other institutions, both national (such as Anti-Corruption Agency, Central 
Election Commission, Independent Media Commission, Kosovo Judicial Institute, the 
Constitutional and Supreme Court of Kosovo) and international (such as OSCE, UNHCR, 
UNMIK, EULEX, SOROS, and the Council of Europe). However, they tried to communicate 
the message that the disappointing progress was due to the Serbian behavior: “Generally 
speaking, the security situation in the north of Kosovo has deteriorated in the second part of 
2011 when the local Serbs opposed decision of Kosovo institutions to establish control in the 14  
whole territory of Kosovo. As a result of barricades that were set up by local Serbs, the non-
Serbian residents were forcefully isolated. Also, members of Serbian community established 
kind of self-isolation” (OIK 2012, 48). Most recently, the reports have reconfirmed the 
existence of Serbian opposition in the northern part of Kosovo: “Serbian extremist groups, 
disappointed, driven by government circles of the Republic of Serbia, led by illegal mayors 
of Serbian authorities have organized protests, in many cases accompanied with the use of 
firearms” (OIK 2014, 59). However, the analyses have been quite salient about abuses of 
human rights of the local Serbs and, equally relevant, what policies would be most 
appropriate so that the overall situation could improve.  
When it comes to the European Commission annual reports about the overall 
performance of independent Kosovo, they seem to suggest that the situation concerning 
human rights is rather problematic, if not alarming. To begin with, the 2008 report, even 
though seeing the constitution as “in line with European standards, which require stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities” (European Commission 2008, 8), observed that “there is still a lack 
of capacity to implement and upgrade human rights standards in Kosovo” (Ibid., 17). A year 
later, the situation was assessed similarly to the previous one, but this time, the EU’s report 
offered two reasons as to why it could be very difficult for Kosovo to secure progress in 
human rights area: first, “Kosovo’s cooperation with human rights bodies is limited since 
Kosovo is not a member of the UN nor of the Council of Europe. Consequently, Kosovo’s 
citizens do not have the possibility to lodge a complaint with the European Court of Human 
Rights against Kosovo’s authorities” and, second, “[s]ome municipal human rights units are 
not operational, in particular in Kosovo Serb majority municipalities, which are reluctant to 
cooperate with the central authorities” (European Commission 2009, 11). Thus, what the 
Europeans tried to do here is to suggest how important international recognition of Kosovo’s 
independence was, putting it almost as a precondition for regulation and human rights 
improvements. In addition, they presented the lack of participation of the Kosovo Serbs as a 
general obstacle to progress – an assessment that surely requires a detailed consideration of 
the whole post-1999 dynamic and especially the 2004 riots. 
In 2008 the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) was 
established and one of its tasks has been to ensure that, amongst others, cases of war crimes 
and inter-ethnic crimes “are properly investigated, prosecuted, adjudicated and enforced, 15  
according to the applicable law” (EU Council 2008a). Still, the notion of human rights is not 
present in the main EULEX-related official documents. Even though the EU mission was 
instated and regardless of its performance, the subsequent European Commission reports 
continued to state that the actual problem in achieving progress with regard to human rights 
in Kosovo will be due to the state’s lack of seat in the UN and the Council of Europe and thus 
not being subject to their frameworks for reporting and cooperation on human rights matters 
– a major challenge which in the Commission’s view required the following adjustment: 
“The institutional set-up promoting and enforcing human rights needs to be simplified” 
(European Commission 2011, 14). However, the Commission’s optimism expressed in 2012 
– assessing that “Kosovo has made considerable progress on its path towards the EU since 
the conflict of the late 1990s [and that it] has put in place a stable institutional and legal 
framework required for democratic governance and protection of human rights, of all 
minorities living in Kosovo as well as of rights of returning displaced persons” (European 
Commission 2012, 11) – did not seem so obvious a year later when the Commission outlined 
the existence of confusion with regard to responsibilities in dealing with the human rights-
related issues, criticized “the unsatisfactory implementation of recommendations issued by 
the Ombudsperson” and the lack of capacity “to improve implementation of the existing legal 
framework and enforcement of decisions remedying human rights infringements” (European 
Commission 2013, 14). In 2014, Kosovo, although seen as having made some progress, was 
urged “to adopt the laws on anti-discrimination, Ombudsperson and gender equality as a 
package, so as to ensure coherence and complementarity in human rights legislation” and to 
update its human rights strategy, “including implementing mechanisms as set out in the 
human rights law package, to provide for a sustainable, long-term strategic approach. Human 
rights issues at all levels need to be put higher on the political agenda, in particular as 
concerns enforcement” (European Commission 2014, 16–17). Most recently, the 
Commission concluded that “some progress was made,” largely due to “the adoption of the 
package of human rights laws,” but still, “[i]mplementation of human rights is hindered by a 
lack of resources and political commitment, including at local level” (European Commission 
2015, 20). Furthermore, the Commission noted “an increasing trend of incidents occurred 
targeting the Kosovo Serb community residing in western Kosovo, with frequent thefts from 
homes causing a heightened sense of insecurity within the affected community” (Ibid., 26). 
While the above-examined official documents, including both Kosovo’s constitution 16  
and subsequent EU-produced reports, clearly acknowledge the relevance of human rights, 
they do not seem to offer any substantial strategies in terms of how to address existing abuses 
and prevent future ones. Moreover, the General Assembly, although very much concerned 
about human rights before the 1999 international involvement, in the post-1999 period, seems 
to have ignored the question of human rights and to have focused more on the financing of 
UNMIK. The capacity to establish an adequate approach vis-à-vis such an important issue 
has been even more questionable since the publication of “Inhuman Treatment of People and 
Illicit Trafficking in Human Organs in Kosovo,” a report produced in 2010 by Dick Marty, 
on behalf of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Council of Europe. 
The report is inspired by the revelations of Carla del Ponte, the former Prosecutor at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, about serious crimes committed 
by members of the Kosovo Liberation Army against Serbian nationals who decided to stay in 
Kosovo after the 1999 conflict (Council of Europe 2010). Aware of the issue, EULEX started 
a preliminary investigation into the allegations outlined in the Marty report in January 2011. 
As suggested by Amnesty International (2012, 49), the time to prioritize war crimes has come 
and thus “measures must be taken by EULEX in 2012–2014 to develop the capacity and 
independence of both prosecutors and judges, to ensure that in the future, Kosovo will be able 
to prosecute crimes under international law and other grave human rights violations.” All of 
the above-outlined dilemmas inspired the EU and the Council of Europe to pursue a project 
that would propose mechanisms capable of enhancing human rights protection in Kosovo. As 
rightly outlined by a group of authors, although there are many activities taking place in the 
sphere of human rights, there are many shortcomings, including insufficient education and 
knowledge of human rights standards amongst policy makers, lack of political will, low 
prioritization for human rights issue in the government’s agenda, etc. As pointed out, the 
required improvements relate to capacity (to train competent staff), confidence (so that the 
public can trust the existing structures), and focus and simplicity (in order to avoid confusion 
as to who is responsible for policy development, who is entrusted with policy 
implementation, who deals with policy promotion, and who is in charge of redress, 
monitoring and reporting) (EU and Council of Europe 2014).    
Conclusion 17  
 The study of human rights – although representing an important link between comparative 
politics and international relations (Landman, 2005), and thus apparently able to tell us much 
more about dynamics we could potentially face in Kosovo – seems to have often been of 
secondary relevance. The question of human rights is of utmost relevance for local political 
institutions and processes of democratization as well as international organizations and 
foreign policy analysis. With a problematic history, characterized by human rights abuses, it 
is rather difficult to predict when the situation within independent Kosovo will improve.  
As I pointed out, Members of the European Parliament started discussing human 
rights violations in Kosovo in the early 1980s, trying to understand who was really to be 
blamed. It was only during the Yugoslav state crisis that a clearer picture was established. 
Still, EU representatives – even though they claimed to have taken the human rights aspect 
seriously when shaping their policy of recognition, insisting that “protection of human rights 
and rights of ethnic and national groups constitute universal, objective standards, which leave 
no room for compromise” (European Community 1991) – they did not include Kosovo in 
their list of priorities. They were primarily concerned with Yugoslav republics, not provinces. 
Later, the escalation of fighting between the Serbian forces and Kosovo Albanians resulted in 
the NATO-led 1999 intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, aimed at 
preventing further atrocities against the latter. Unfortunately, neither this nor any later signal 
in the post-interventionist period (in which role-swapping has taken place, with the rights of 
the remaining Serbian minority being regularly abused by the dominant Albanian 
population), has managed to generate any major improvements and, more importantly, lasting 
solutions. Before Kosovo’s proclamation of independence, the policy of “standards before 
status” was introduced, but soon after abandoned. Then, the EU-Balkans Thessaloniki 
summit clearly stated that the future of the Balkans lies within the EU (EU Council 2003), 
but the local communities failed to interpret this as an opportunity. The subsequent riots and 
continuous incapacity to protect human rights of the local minorities continued, so that the 
Brussels administration, while confirming its interest in the stability of the region and thus 
playing the central role in the attempts determining the Kosovo’s future status, insisted that 
human rights should represent one of the key principles in the process: “Kosovo’s status must 
be based on multi-ethnicity, the protection of minorities, the protection of cultural and 
religious heritage” (EU Council 2005).  18  
Since the proclamation of independence, Kosovo, in contrast to its constitutional 
stipulations, has struggled to make progress in the human rights area. However, what seems 
to dominate the existing EU and local Albanian explanations is the fact that Kosovo has not 
secured a seat in the UN and the Council of Europe yet. With regard to the EU, 23 out of its 
28 Member States have so far recognized Kosovo as an independent state. Based on various 
debates, the ones who refuse to do so are heavily criticized; for example, Ulrike Lunacek, one 
of the MEPs, goes as far as to state that the five should be forced to recognize Kosovo, but 
then clearly outlines various problems they can use as a justification why not to do it, 
including the human rights-related issues: “The relative weakness of the Kosovo government, 
after fraudulent elections and a prolonged process for the voting and inauguration of the new 
President and the formation of government in the spring of 2011, as well as organized crime 
allegations by Dick Marty’s report in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 
do not give Prime Minister Thaci the argumentative standing and power that he would need 
in order to show the necessary strength in the diplomatic arena and at home” (Lunacek 2012, 
151). Still, even when the above seats and additional recognition are secured at some point, 
and hopefully some progress made in the human rights area rendering international presence 
and monitoring in the region come to an end, it will be up to Kosovo’s peoples, who are the 
main actors, to decide on future progress. According to some of the non-governmental 
organizations that have followed the developments in Kosovo since the first serious 
violations of human rights, the so-called normalization agreement signed between Serbia and 
Kosovo in April 2013 represents “a landmark opportunity to improve human rights protection 
in both countries” characterized by “serious human rights abuses” (Human Rights Watch, 
2013) – an opportunity largely inspired by some previous assessments underlying that “[a]ny 
failure to prosecute human rights abuses is unacceptable” and calling “the former warring 
parties to see that the prosecution of ‘their own’ is in compliance with international 
obligations” (Amnesty International 2012, 55). More recently, the long document 
accompanying the signature of the Stabilization and Association Agreement between the EU 
and Kosovo, in April 2015, presented “[t]he development of regional cooperation and good 
neighbourly relations as well as respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities” as crucial for the overall success of the agreement (EU 2015).  
With the above-outlined concerns and policy (re)considerations in mind, even if a key 
player such as the European Union has not managed to develop and stick to a single standard, 19  
it is reasonable to argue that it is nevertheless a combination of international standards and 
incentives, on one hand, and local readiness to grapple with the question of human rights 
abuses (taking place before as well as now), on the other, that can provide a credible 
platform, so that the concerned parties can embark new and, more relevantly, shared 
beginnings. However, what remains problematic and surely capable of affecting the progress 
of the overall process is the question of one’s own role and responsibility in order to prevent 
feelings of inferiority and predestined failure.   
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